

Extract from 2018 Remuneration Report

Remuneration Policy Report

Our current Remuneration policy was approved at the 2017 AGM and it is intended that this policy will apply for three years from that date, although the Committee may seek approval for a new policy at an earlier point if it is considered appropriate. The Policy Report that follows is unchanged from that published in last year's annual report save for the following minor changes:

- Update to page references
- Update to pay scenario charts
- Update to reference dates, as appropriate.

Key principles of the Remuneration policy

Objective

To provide fair remuneration arrangements that allow for enhanced rewards for delivery of superior performance by allowing for the possibility of upper quartile rewards for upper quartile performance, that align Directors' and Shareholders' interests and take account of risk.

Our policy for executives reflects a preference that we believe is shared by the majority of our Shareholders — to rely more heavily on the value of variable performance-related rewards, rather than on the fixed elements of pay. The rationale is to incentivise and reward success.

Weighting towards long-term, performance-related pay

The focus of our executive remuneration is, therefore, weighted towards performance-related pay with a significant element weighted towards long-term rather than short-term performance. We believe that, properly structured and with suitable safeguards, variable, performance-related rewards are the best way of linking pay to strategy, risk management and Shareholders' interests.

Directors' Remuneration policy

Summary of the Remuneration policy for Executive Directors (Policy Table)

Purpose and link to strategy	Operation	Opportunity	Performance metrics
Fixed pay			
Base salary			
Should be at a level that is (i) fair and (ii) capable, when taken with the gearing effect of performance-related pay, of delivering upper quartile actual remuneration for upper quartile performance.	Base salaries are reviewed annually, with reference to the individual's role, experience and performance; salary levels at relevant comparators are considered but do not in themselves drive decision-making.	In respect of existing Executive Directors, it is anticipated that decisions on any salary increases will be guided by the increases for the wider employee population over the term of this policy. In certain circumstances (including, but not limited to, a material increase in job size or complexity, market forces, promotion or recruitment) the Committee has discretion to make appropriate adjustments to salary levels to ensure they remain fair and competitive. Latest salaries are set out in the Annual Report on Remuneration on page 118.	Business and individual performance are considerations in setting base salary.
Pension			
To provide market competitive retirement benefits.	Cash supplement in lieu wholly or partly of pension benefits for ongoing service and/or membership of the Group's Defined Benefit or Defined Contribution pension scheme.	All the Executive Directors currently receive a cash supplement of 25% of base pay in lieu of all pension benefits. The cash supplement payable is set having regard to market practice, and in the context of the other elements of the remuneration package, notably base salary. Other than in exceptional cases (such as to replace existing arrangements for new recruits), the Committee does not anticipate employer contributions into a defined contribution pension scheme or cash in lieu of benefit as being at a cost to the Company that would exceed 25% of base salary.	Not performance-related.

Purpose and link to strategy	Operation	Opportunity	Performance metrics
Fixed pay			
Benefits			
Designed to be competitive in the market in which the individual is employed or to meet costs effectively incurred at the Company's request.	<p>A range of benefits are provided which may include: life insurance; medical insurance; car and fuel benefits and allowances; home to work travel and related costs, if agreed on an individual basis or if incurred at the request of the Company; accommodation benefits and related costs, if based away from home at the request of the Company; Board function-related costs; and, in certain circumstances, cash allowances in respect of the tax charge on accommodation or travel to work benefit, if incurred at the request of the Company or with its prior approval.</p> <p>Other benefits (e.g. relocation) may be offered if considered appropriate and reasonable by the Committee.</p>	<p>Benefit values vary by role and are periodically reviewed and set at a level which the Committee considers appropriate in light of relevant market practice for the role and individual circumstances.</p> <p>The cost of the benefits provided changes in accordance with market conditions and will, therefore, determine the maximum amount that would be paid in the form of benefits during the period of this policy. The Committee retains the discretion to approve a higher cost in certain circumstances (e.g. relocation) or in circumstances where factors outside the Company's control have changed materially.</p>	Not performance-related.

Purpose and link to strategy	Operation	Opportunity	Performance metrics
Variable pay			
Annual bonus			
<p>To underpin delivery of year on year financial performance and progress towards strategic non-financial objectives, being structured to motivate delivery against targets and achievement of stretching outperformance, whilst mindful of achievement of long-term strategy and longer-term risks to the Company.</p> <p>The requirement to defer a substantial part of bonus into Company shares strengthens the link to long-term sustainable growth.</p>	<p>Performance targets are set at the start of the year and reflect the responsibilities of the executive in relation to the delivery of our strategy.</p> <p>At the end of the year, the Committee determines the extent to which these targets have been achieved. The Committee has the discretion to adjust the outcome (up or down) within the limits of the plan for corporate transactions, unforeseen events, factors outside reasonable management control, changes to business priorities or operational arrangements, to ensure targets represent and remain a fair measure of performance. In addition, the Committee considers health and safety performance and it may reduce or cancel any annual bonus otherwise payable if it considers it appropriate to do so in light of that performance.</p> <p>At least 40% of annual bonus payments for Executive Directors must be deferred into awards over Company shares for three years. Mandatory deferred bonus awards are subject to potential forfeiture if the holder leaves before the awards vest. Malus and clawback apply to cash and deferred bonus awards: if the accounts used to determine the bonus level have to be materially corrected; if the Committee subsequently comes to a view that bonus year performance was materially worse than originally believed; in the event of gross misconduct; or if the award holder leaves employment in circumstances in which the deferred bonus did not lapse and facts emerge which, if known at the time, would have caused the deferred bonus to lapse on leaving or caused the Committee to exercise any discretion differently.</p>	<p>Maximum bonus opportunity is 150% of salary.</p> <p>For achievement of threshold, up to 15% of maximum bonus is earned; for achievement of target up to 55% of maximum bonus is earned.</p>	<p>Performance is determined by the Committee on an annual basis by reference to Group and/or sector financial measures, e.g. EPS growth, PBT, OCF, as well as the achievement of non-financial objectives.</p> <p>The financial and personal/strategic objectives are typically weighted 80% and 20% of maximum, respectively.</p> <p>The Committee retains discretion to vary the financial measures and their weightings annually, to ensure alignment with the business priorities for the year.</p> <p>Measures used for the 2017/18 annual bonus and proposed for 2018/19 are included in the Annual Report on Remuneration on pages 115 and 119.</p>

Purpose and link to strategy	Operation	Opportunity	Performance metrics
Variable pay			
Performance Share Plan (PSP)			
<p>To incentivise delivery of top quartile Shareholder returns and earnings growth over the longer term.</p> <p>Long-term measures guard against short-term steps being taken to maximise annual rewards at the expense of future performance.</p>	<p>The Committee has the ability to grant nil-cost options or conditional share awards under the PSP.</p> <p>The award levels and performance conditions, on which vesting depends, are reviewed from time to time to ensure they remain appropriate.</p> <p>Participants will receive cash or shares equal to the value of any dividends that would have been paid over the vesting period on awards that vest.</p> <p>The Committee has the ability to exercise discretion to override the PSP outcome in circumstances where strict application of the performance conditions would produce a result inconsistent with the Company's remuneration principles.</p> <p>An additional two-year holding period will apply to Executive Directors' vested shares before they are released.</p> <p>Malus and clawback apply to PSP awards: if there is a misstatement of the Group's financial results for any period; if the Committee subsequently comes to a view that performance was materially worse than originally believed; in the event of gross misconduct; or if the award holder leaves employment in circumstances in which the award did not lapse and facts emerge which, if known at the time, would have caused the award to lapse on leaving or caused the Committee to exercise any discretion differently.</p>	<p>Maximum annual PSP awards of up to 200% of base pay.</p> <p>For each performance condition applying to an award, 16.7% of the maximum award will vest for threshold performance.</p>	<p>Vesting of PSP awards is subject to continued employment and Company performance over a three-year performance period.</p> <p>2018/19 PSP awards will vest if the achievement of stretching EPS, TSR and ROCE targets.</p> <p>The Committee will review the performance measures, their weightings, and performance targets annually to ensure continued alignment with Company strategy.</p> <p>Details of measures and targets used for specific PSP grants are included in the Annual Report on Remuneration on pages 120 to 122.</p>
All-employee plans — Babcock Employee Share Plan			
<p>To encourage employee ownership of Company shares.</p>	<p>Open to all UK tax resident employees of participating Group companies. Executive Directors are eligible to participate.</p> <p>The plan is an HMRC approved share incentive plan that allows an employee to purchase shares (through the plan trustees) out of pre-tax salary which, if held for periods of time approved by HMRC (currently three to five years), are taxed on a favourable basis.</p> <p>The Company can match purchased shares with an award of free shares. Matching shares are forfeited if employees leave within three years of their award (other than for 'good leaver' reasons).</p>	<p>Participants can purchase shares up to the prevailing HMRC limit at the time employees are invited to participate.</p> <p>The Company currently offers to match purchases made through the plan at the rate of one free matching share for every 10 shares purchased. The matching rate is reviewed periodically, and any future offer will be bound by the prevailing HMRC limit.</p>	<p>Not performance-related.</p>

Approach to recruitment remuneration — (Recruitment policy)

In the case of hiring or appointing a new Executive Director, the Committee may make use of any of the existing components of remuneration, as follows:

Pay element	Policy on recruitment	Maximum
Salary	Based on size and nature of responsibilities of the proposed role; the candidate's experience; implications for total remuneration positioning vs. market pay levels for comparable roles; internal relativities; and the candidate's current salary.	N/A
Pension	Membership of pension scheme or salary supplement on a similar basis to other executives, as described in the policy table.	N/A
Benefits	Provision of benefits on a similar basis to other executives, as described in the policy table.	N/A
Annual bonus	As described in the policy table, and may be pro-rated for proportion of year served.	150% of salary
Performance Share Plan	New appointees may be granted awards under the PSP on similar terms to other executives.	200% of salary
All-employee plans	New appointees may be granted awards under all-employee plans on similar terms to other executives.	As per Policy Table
Other	In determining appropriate remuneration for new Executive Directors, the Committee will take into consideration all relevant factors (including quantum, the nature of remuneration and where the candidate was recruited from) to ensure that arrangements are in the best interests of the Company and its Shareholders. The Committee may also make an award in respect of a new appointment to 'replace' incentive arrangements forfeited on leaving a previous employer. In doing so, the Committee will consider relevant factors, including any performance conditions attached to these awards, time to vesting and the likelihood of those conditions being met. The fair value of the compensatory award would not be greater than the awards being replaced. In order to facilitate like for like compensatory awards on recruitment, the Committee may avail itself of Listing Rule 9.4.2(2), if required.	N/A

Other recruitment events

Internal promotion	When appointing a new Executive Director by way of promotion from an internal role, the Committee will be consistent with the policy for external hires detailed above. Where an individual has contractual commitments, outstanding incentive awards and/or pension arrangements prior to their promotion to Executive Director, the Company may honour those arrangements; however, where appropriate, these would be expected to transition over time to the arrangements stated above.	N/A
Non-Executive Director	When recruiting a new Non-Executive Director, the Committee or Board will structure pay in line with the existing policy, namely a base fee in line with the current fee schedule, with additional fees for fulfilling the role of Senior Independent Director and Chairmanship of the Audit and Risk and Remuneration Committees.	N/A

Payments from existing awards and commitments

Executive Directors are eligible to receive payment from any award or other commitment made prior to the approval and implementation of the Remuneration policy detailed in this report.

Performance measure selection and approach to target setting

The measures used under annual bonus plans are selected annually to reflect the Group's main strategic objectives for the year and reflect both financial and non-financial priorities. Performance targets are set to be stretching but achievable, taking into account the Company's strategic priorities and the economic environment in which the Company operates. Financial targets are set taking into account a range of reference points, including the Group's strategic and operating plan.

The Committee considers at length the appropriate financial conditions and non-financial objectives to attach to annual bonus awards and the financial targets to attach to share awards to ensure they continue to be: (i) relevant to the Group's strategic objectives and aligned with Shareholders' interests, mindful of risk management; and (ii) fair by being suitably stretching whilst realistic.

The Committee believes that TSR, EPS and ROCE continue to be effective measures of long-term performance for the Company, providing a good balance between Shareholder value creation and line of sight for executives.

The TSR performance measure is tested by reference to the Company's relative long-term share price performance against suitable peers. The Committee believes that the use of relative TSR provides strong alignment with Shareholders' interests by incentivising management for the delivery of above-market returns. The TSR calculation would normally use a 12-month average for opening and closing share prices adjusted for dividends paid during the period. The Company feels that this is the most appropriate period because a 12-month average ensures both that short-term market volatility is excluded and that for each company a 12-month period will capture the impact of the announcement of results and payment of dividends. A shorter period would not capture all these events and would not necessarily put all companies on an equal footing.

The use of an EPS growth performance measure, in the opinion of the Committee, focuses management on continued strong financial performance and is heavily dependent on the Company's success in achieving its strategic goals. The Committee believes that ROCE reinforces the focus on returns for Shareholders and encourages capital discipline.

The Remuneration Committee has the discretion to make adjustments to the calculation of short and long-term performance outcomes in circumstances where application of the formula would produce a result inconsistent with the Company's remuneration principles. Such circumstances may include: changes in accounting standards and certain major corporate events such as rights issues, share buybacks, special dividends, corporate restructurings, acquisitions and disposals.

The Committee reviews the performance conditions for share awards prior to the start of each cycle to ensure they remain appropriate. No material reduction in long-term incentive targets for future awards would be made without prior consultation with our major Shareholders.

Differences between Executive Director and general employee remuneration

The policy and practice with regard to the remuneration of senior executives below the Board is consistent with that for the Executive Directors. Senior executives generally participate in the same long-term incentives as the Executive Directors with similar performance measures applied. The Remuneration policy for our Executive Directors is considered with the remuneration philosophy and principles that underpin remuneration for the wider Group in mind. The remuneration arrangements for other employees reflect local market practice and seniority of each role. As a result, the levels and structure of remuneration for different groups of employees will differ from the policy for executives as set out above but with the common intention that remuneration arrangements for all groups might reasonably be considered to be fair having regard to such factors.

Balance of remuneration for Executive Directors

The charts below provide an estimate of the potential future reward opportunities for the Executive Directors, and the potential split between the different elements of remuneration under three different performance scenarios: 'Minimum', 'On-target' and 'Maximum'.

Potential reward opportunities are based on the Company's Remuneration policy and implementation in 2018/19, as outlined in the Chairman's statement and later in the Annual Report on Remuneration, applied to base salaries as at 1 April 2018. Note that the projected values exclude the impact of any share price movements. For this reason, were the PSP shares to vest in full, actual total remuneration may exceed the value shown in the chart below.

Chief Executive

Archie Bethel (£'000)




Group Finance Director

Franco Martinelli (£'000)



Chief Executive, Land

John Davies (£'000)



- Fixed remuneration
- Annual variable remuneration
- Long-term incentives

The 'Minimum' scenario shows base salary, pension (and/or pay in lieu of pension) and benefits (i.e. fixed remuneration). These are the only elements of the Executive Directors' remuneration packages which are not at risk.

The 'On-target' scenario reflects fixed remuneration as above, plus a pay-out of 55% of the annual bonus and threshold vesting of 16.7% of the maximum award under the PSP.

The 'Maximum' scenario reflects fixed remuneration, plus full pay-out of all incentives.

Shareholding guidelines for Executive Directors

The Committee sets shareholding guidelines for Executive Directors. The current guideline is to build and maintain, over time, a personal (and/or spousal) holding of shares in the Company equivalent in value to at least twice the Executive Director's annual base salary (three times for the CEO).

The guidelines also state that an Executive Director is expected to retain at least half of any shares acquired on the exercise of a share award that remain after the sale of sufficient shares to cover tax and national insurance triggered by the exercise (and associated dealing costs) until the guideline level is achieved and thereafter maintained. The Executive Directors' compliance with these guidelines is shown in the table on page 126.

Details of Directors' service contracts and exit payments and treatment of awards on a change of control

The following summarises the key terms (excluding remuneration) of the Directors' service contracts or terms of appointment:

Executive Directors

Name	Date of service contract	Notice period
Archie Bethel (Chief Executive)	1 April 2016	12 months from Company, 12 months from Director
Franco Martinelli (Group Finance Director)	1 August 2014	12 months from Company, 12 months from Director
Bill Tame (Chief Executive, Global Growth and Operations)*	1 October 2001 (amended by letters dated 5 May 2004 and 3 April 2006)	12 months from Company, 6 months from Director
John Davies (Chief Executive, Land)	20 December 2012	12 months from Company, 12 months from Director

* Bill Tame gave notice of his retirement in accordance with his service contract. He stepped down from the Board on 31 March 2018 and will retire from the Company on 30 June 2018.

The latest service contracts are available for inspection at the Company's registered office and will also be available at the Company's Annual General Meeting.

The Company's policy is that Executive Directors' service contracts should be capable of being terminated by the Company on not more than 12 months' notice. The Executive Directors' service contracts entitle the Company to terminate their employment without notice by making a payment of salary and benefits in lieu of notice. In these circumstances, since 2012, new Executive Directors' contracts (those for Archie Bethel, John Davies and Franco Martinelli) allow the Company to choose to make the payment in lieu by monthly instalments and mitigation applies such that the Committee may decide to reduce or discontinue further instalments. For contracts made before 2012 (for Bill Tame only) such a payment would be by way of a lump sum payment on termination. If the Company terminates an Executive Director's service contract, it will have regard to all the circumstances (including the scope for mitigation) and the Company's interests in determining the amount of compensation, if any, payable to him in connection with that termination.

The contract for Bill Tame contains provisions which provide that, within 90 days of the occurrence of a change of control of the Company, he may terminate his employment forthwith. If he exercises this right, he is entitled, for a 12-month period, to be paid (on a monthly basis) his base salary plus 40% (compared to a maximum entitlement under the annual bonus plan of 150%) in lieu of bonus and all other contractual entitlements. From this payment there is to be deducted any amount that he receives by way of income, if it exceeds 10% of his Babcock salary, from other sources that he would not have been able to earn had he continued in employment with the Company.

The contract for Bill Tame also provides that, if the Company terminates his appointment within 12 months of a change of control, he would be entitled to a termination payment equal to 100% of annual salary (plus 40% in lieu of bonus and all other benefits), subject to any additional entitlement as outlined below.

No other Executive Director has these arrangements in their service contract.

In addition to the contractual provisions regarding payment on termination set out above, the Company's incentive plans contain provisions for termination of employment, where the Committee has the discretion to determine the level of award vesting.

Component	Treatment on a change of control	Treatment for a good leaver ²	Treatment for other leavers
Annual bonus	Will be paid a time pro-rated proportion, subject to performance during the year, generally paid immediately, with Committee discretion to treat otherwise ¹ .	Will be paid a time pro-rated proportion, subject to performance during the year, generally paid at the year end, with Committee discretion to treat otherwise.	No annual bonus entitlement, unless the Committee exercises discretion to treat otherwise.
Deferred bonus awards	Awards may be exercised in full on the change of control, with Committee discretion to treat otherwise.	Entitled to retain a time pro-rated proportion which will generally vest at the normal vesting date, with Committee discretion to treat otherwise.	Outstanding awards are forfeited unless the Committee exercises its discretion to treat otherwise.
PSP	Awards generally vest immediately and, for performance-related awards, will be pro-rated for time and remain subject to performance conditions, with Committee discretion to treat otherwise.	Entitled to retain a time pro-rated proportion, which remains subject to performance conditions tested at the normal vesting date. In very exceptional circumstances, the Committee has discretion to allow immediate vesting but time pro-rating will always apply.	Outstanding awards are forfeited, unless the Committee exercises discretion to treat otherwise.

1. Treatment of bonus on a change of control for Bill Tame is also subject of the provisions outlined on page 108 above.
2. An individual would generally be considered a 'good leaver' if they leave the Group's employment by reason of injury, ill-health, disability, redundancy or retirement (in each case evidenced to the Committee's satisfaction). The treatment of share awards held by Directors who leave on other grounds is entirely at the discretion of the Committee and in deciding whether (and the extent to which) it would be appropriate to exercise that discretion the Committee will have regard to all the circumstances.

External appointments of Executive Directors

The Executive Directors may accept external appointments with the prior approval of the Chairman, provided that such appointments do not prejudice the individual's ability to fulfil their duties at the Group. Any fees for outside appointments are retained by the Director.

Chairman and Non-Executive Directors

Name	Date of appointment as a Director	Date of current appointment letters	Anticipated expiry of present term of appointment (subject to annual re-election)
Mike Turner (Chairman)	1 June 2008	22 February 2017	AGM 2020
Sir David Omand	1 April 2009	17 May 2018	AGM 2021
Ian Duncan	10 November 2010	25 January 2016	AGM 2019
Anna Stewart*	1 November 2012	26 March 2015	
Jeff Randall	1 April 2014	22 February 2017	AGM 2020
Myles Lee	1 April 2015	17 May 2018	AGM 2021
Victoire de Margerie	1 February 2016	3 December 2015	AGM 2019
Lucy Dimes	1 April 2018	5 March 2018	AGM 2021
Kjersti Wiklund	1 April 2018	5 March 2018	AGM 2021

* Anna Stewart sadly died on 5 October 2017.

The latest written terms of appointment are available for inspection at the Company's registered office and at the Company's Annual General Meeting. The expected time commitment of Non-Executive Directors is set out in their current written terms of appointment.

The Group's Non-Executive Directors serve under letters of appointment as detailed in the table above, normally for no more than three-year terms at a time; however, in all cases appointments are terminable at will at any time by the Company or the Director. All Non-Executive Directors are subject to annual re-election by the Company in general meeting in line with the UK Corporate Governance Code.

Details of the Non-Executive Directors' terms of appointment are shown in the table. The appointment and re-appointment and the remuneration of Non-Executive Directors are matters reserved for the Nominations Committee and Executive Directors, respectively.

The Non-Executive Directors' fees have been set at a level to reflect the amount of time and level of involvement required in order to carry out their duties as members of the Board and its Committees. The Non-Executive Directors are not eligible to participate in the Company's performance-related incentive plans and do not receive any pension contributions.

Details of the policy on fees paid to our Non-Executive Directors are set out in the table below:

Function	Operation	Opportunity	Performance measures
To attract and retain high-calibre Non-Executive Directors with commercial and other experience relevant to the Company	<p>Fee levels are reviewed against market practice from time to time (by the Chairman and the Executive Directors in the case of Non-Executive Director fees and by the Committee in respect of fees payable to the Chairman), with any adjustments normally being made on 1 April in the review year. Additional fees are payable for acting as Chairman of the Audit and Risk, and Remuneration Committees.</p> <p>Non-Executive Directors do not participate in any incentive schemes, nor do they receive any pension or benefits (other than the cost of nominal travel and accommodation expenses).</p> <p>Fee levels are reviewed by reference to FTSE listed companies of similar size and complexity. Time commitment, level of involvement required and responsibility are taken into account when reviewing fee levels. This may result in higher fee levels for overseas Directors.</p> <p>Fees for the year ending 31 March 2018 and those for the year ending 31 March 2019 are set out in the Annual Report on Remuneration on page 124.</p>	<p>Non-Executive Director fee increases are applied in line with the outcome of the periodic fee review.</p> <p>Any increases to the Non-Executive Director fee will typically be in line with general movements in market levels of Non-Executive Director fees.</p> <p>In the event that there is a material misalignment with the market or a change in the complexity, responsibility or time commitment required to fulfil a Non-Executive Director role, the Board has discretion to make an appropriate adjustment to the fee level.</p>	None

Consideration of employee views

When reviewing Executive Director pay the Committee is aware of the proposals for review of remuneration of all employees. The Committee receives regular updates on salary increases, bonus and share awards made to employees throughout the Group. These matters are considered when conducting the annual review of executive remuneration.

The Company seeks to promote and maintain good relationships with employee representative bodies as part of its employee engagement strategy and consults on matters affecting employees and business performance as required in each case by law and regulation in the jurisdictions in which the Company operates. The Company now formally presents a summary of its policy for remuneration arrangements for Executive Directors to the Babcock Employee Forum, which is attended by representatives from across the business operations, and will consider any feedback from that Forum.

Consideration of Shareholder views

When determining remuneration, the Committee takes into account views of leading Shareholders and best practice guidelines issued by institutional Shareholder bodies. The Committee is always open to feedback from Shareholders on Remuneration policy and arrangements and commits to undergoing consultation with leading Shareholders in advance of any significant changes to Remuneration policy. The Committee will continue to monitor trends and developments in corporate governance and market practice to ensure the structure of the executive remuneration remains appropriate.

Further details of the votes received on the 2017 Directors' Remuneration policy report and the 2017 Annual Report on Remuneration are provided on page 112.